

eight-tenths of the entire hsien was still in I hands up to the thirtieth year. In addition to Lei-po, the hsien of Ma-pien and O-pien also made similar efforts. Later, around the twenty-ninth year, the government of Szechwan again established a Reclamation Bureau for Lei, Ma, Ô, P'ing, and Mr. Jen Ying-ts'ang was appointed as head. He maintained the status quo of the reclamation work but put it entirely under the Bureau's control. After ten years these attempts at reclamation have produced considerable results. Unfortunately, political measures were not in keeping with these efforts so that conflicts between the Chinese and I are worse than ever. The I are very resentful over reclamation, for they think that the Chinese are using military power to seize their territories. Their enmity toward the Chinese has grown to such a degree that recently the I of O-pien, who have never rebelled, have also begun to agitate. Henceforth it may be borne in mind that there are disadvantages as well as advantages in the program. At any rate this is definitely not the way for a complete settlement of the I region. From now on, those who would discuss reclamation should consider every point in detail before taking action.

Shortly after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Government moved west, and the problem of the I region of Liang-shan gradually came to the attention of the public. After the organization of Sikang into a province, rehabilitation of the Ning districts was considered one of the important projects. A committee for investigating I affairs in these districts was established. It was later reorganized as the "Reclamation Committee of the Ning Districts," with a larger scope of duties, although I affairs were still its main concern. Great progress was made within three years. Aggression and appeasement policies--with more emphasis on the latter--were tried at the same time. Although the basic principles are the same as those adopted in the Ch'ing period, these methods produced better results because of more skillful operations and stricter organization. Take, for instance, the city of Chao-ch'ieh which fell in the eighth year of the Republic and remained in I hands for 20 years. Although the provincial government formerly appointed a magistrate, this magistrate always lived in Hsi-ch'ang and never went into the hsien to perform his duties. The city was reconquered in the twenty-eighth year, but in January of the thirtieth year, it again fell into the hands of the rebellious Pa-ch'ih chia. In March of the same year, however, the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Hsi-ch'ang and the Reclamation Committee sent combined forces to attack and regained it. Communication between Hsi-ch'ang and

669 Chao-chüeh was again restored under Chinese control. The peculiar
175 situation of the past 20 years was thus brought to an end, marking the
636 progress made recently concerning I affairs.

The majority of those conversant with I affairs agree that the policy toward the I region of Liang-shan must depend somewhat on military strength and repression. Formerly, however, /125/ most
669 people have had two kinds of mistaken notions concerning this problem,
175 which should be corrected here. One was the feeling that Liang-shan was difficult to conquer; the other was the belief that a complete military conquest of Liang-shan was necessary in order to produce results. It will now be shown why neither of these two notions is actually correct. First, the combat strength of the I has been overrated. It is true that in the last few centuries the Lolo often made troubles, which became particularly violent after the establishment of the Republic. A close scrutiny, however, reveals that the inability to conquer Liang-shan in former times was really due to the fact that conquest was never attempted. The I caused sporadic disturbances, but they generally dispersed upon the arrival of large troops. If there had been foresight during the Ch'ing period and some soldiers had been sent to occupy the strategic grounds of Nin-nin-pa and Yeh-lu-na-ta inside Liang-shan, these problems would have been resolved long ago and would not have recurred today. It is true that there is certain unity among the I, who can also at times make swift and ingenious military moves. These circumstances, together with topographic difficulties and lack of roads and provisions along the way, may have caused some Chinese commanders to feel that it was a difficult task to subdue the I of Liang-shan. Nevertheless, the obstacles are by no means greater than those found in regions such as Sikang, Tibet, Ch'ing-hai and Mongolia, where military expeditions undertaken during the first years of the Ch'ing period were successful. There would be no difficulty in achieving success in as tiny a region as Liang-shan if the whole matter could be treated seriously and detailed planning be done beforehand, so that the troops might advance with confidence and care, constructing bridges and roads, establishing military posts and securing provisions along the way. Because of their observance of these requirements, famous commanders in the past, such as Liu T'ing-chen of the late Ch'ing period and Teng Hsin-t'ing of the Republic times, were always victorious in their expeditions against the I. In the past 20 years, some militarists have increased the strength of the Lolo considerably through the unlawful exchange